海德格尔[诗歌 语言 思想]

Now this interpretation of the thingness 物质性，实物性，客观性，实在性 of the thing is as correct and demonstrable 可论证的，显而易见的 in every case 但凡 as the previous one. This already suffices to cast doubt on 引起对什么的怀疑，对什么产生怀疑 its truth. If we consider moreover 而且，此外 what we are searching for, the thingly character of the thing, then this thing-concept again leaves us at a loss. We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes 梅赛德斯公司 in immediate distinction from the

Volkswagen 大众汽车公司 . Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.

In the thing-concept just mentioned there is not so much an assault upon the thing as rather an inordinate 过度的，无节制的 attempt to bring it into the greatest possible proximity 亲近，临近 to us. But a thing never reaches that position as long as we assign as its thingly feature what is perceived by the senses. Whereas the first interpretation keeps the thing at arm's length 疏远 from us, as it were, 可以说是，似乎就是，好像 and sets it too far off, the second makes it press too hard upon us. In both

interpretations the thing vanishes. It is therefore necessary to avoid the exaggerations of both. The thing itself must be allowed to remain in its self-containment 不合群. It must be accepted in its own constancy. This the third interpretation seems to do, which is just as old as the first two. That which gives things their constancy and pith 精髓，核心 but is also at the same time the source of their particular mode of sensuous pressure—colored, resonant洪亮的，共鸣的 , hard, massive—is the matter in things. In this analysis of the thing as matter (hule), form

(morphe) is already coposited. What is constant in a thing, its consistency, lies in the fact that matter stands together with a form. The thing is

formed matter. This interpretation appeals to呼吁，要求 the immediate view with which the thing solicits 征求，祈求 us by its looks (eidos). In this synthesis 综合，合成 of matter and form a thing-concept has finally been found which applies equally to things of nature and to use-objects. This concept puts us in a position to answer the question concerning the thingly element in the work of art. The thingly element is manifestly 显然的，明显的 the matter of which it consists. Matter is the substrate 基质，底层 and field for the artist's formative action. But we could have advanced this obvious and well-known definition of the thingly element at the very outset.开始，开端 Why do we make a detour 迂回 through other current thing-concepts? Because we also mistrust this concept of the thing, which represents it as formed matter.

But is not precisely this pair of concepts, matter-form, usually

employed in the domain in which we are supposed to be moving? To be sure. The distinction of matter and form is the conceptual schema 概念模式，概念框图 which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics. This incontestable 无可争辩的，无可置疑的 fact, however, proves neither that the distinction of matter and form is adequately founded, nor that it belongs originally to the domain of art and the art work. Moreover, the range of application 适用范围，适用范围 of this pair of concepts has long extended far beyond the field of aesthetics. Form and content are the most hackneyed 陈腐的，平庸的 concepts under which anything and everything may be

subsumed把什么归入，把什么包括在内. And if form is correlated with the rational and matter with the irrational; if the rational is taken to be the logical and the irrational the alogical非逻辑的; if in addition 另外，此外the subject-object relation is coupled with 与结合，与联合 the

conceptual pair form-matter; then representation has at its command a conceptual machinery 机械，机器 that nothing is capable of withstanding抵挡，反抗.

If, however, it is thus with the distinction between matter and form, how then shall we make use of it to lay hold of the particular domain of mere things by contrast with all other entities? But perhaps this

characterization in terms of matter and form would recover its defining

power if only we reversed 颠倒the process of expanding and emptying these concepts. Certainly, but this presupposes that we know in what

sphere of beings存在，生命，本质 they realize their true defining power. That this is the domain of mere things is so far only an assumption.

Reference to the copious 丰富的，很多的 use made of this conceptual framework in aesthetics might sooner lead to the idea that matter and form are specifications规格 stemming from the nature of the art work and were in the first place transferred from it back to the thing. Where does the matter-form structure have its origin— in the thingly character of the thing or in the workly character of the art work?